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To become a practicing physician, one passes through a demanding course of 
instruction and apprenticeship. The profession guards the reputations of its collective 
number by administering a licensing program. Economists are available with varying 
kinds of preparation, though the standard tends to involve intensive study of 
neoclassical wisdom and completion of an acceptable research endeavor. No licensing 
beyond conferral of the academic degree is required, and some employment is 
available without any formal credential in the discipline. 
Most citizens cherish their freedom to offer even the most bizarre personal 
interpretations of economic matters, and some obtain a public forum for the purpose. 
During the national debate about health care reform in 1995, newspaper readers might 
not have considered it unusual for a highly regarded local physician to be offered 
extensive space in a metropolitan newspaper to present his solutions to problems of 
the health care system. Prestigious medical journals often offer the observations of 
their editors and subscribers on such issues. Of course, as participants, their views of 
the operation of the health care system have some value in the public debate, with 
readers presumably competent to give appropriate weight to self-interest. 
However, such performances establish an environment within which professionals 
certified in medical fields (among others), but with little or no formal training in the 
discipline of economics, are allowed to publish studies of economic issues, with little 
concern for rigor and soundness. Their colleagues, including peer reviewers for 
medical journals, seem to accept such work uncritically, unaware of the degree to 
which they misuse technical economic concepts and methods. 
We follow the eminent Institutionalist, Marc Tool, in believing that " . . . the only 
serious grounds on which political economists for centuries have claimed significance 
for their work have been its alleged relevance to the resolution of real problems facing 
real people in real political economies" [Tool 1979, 293]. Accordingly, we consider it 
appropriate to point out the irrelevance, indeed harmfulness, of trends in public policy 
debate that have the potential to undermine sound decision making about the use of 
resources in the health care system. The trends in question unite sophisticated 
computer techniques with training in statistical inference to develop conclusions that 
are intended to influence health care policy, all covered by casual acceptance of 
misused economic theory. 
Three Dangers 
A danger to health professionals who prize their independence to practice medicine, 
and to their patients, is that the resources necessary for accomplishing their work are 
likely to be restricted by stringent financial criteria. Salaries and bonuses, along with 
ability to prescribe treatments and diagnostic tests, are at stake. These considerations 
are widely discussed in the industry and among patients, third-party payers, and the 
general public. 
Unfortunately, failure to anticipate distant perils enables some physicians to 
contribute to trends that may well increase the probability of their occurrence. An 
eagerness is apparent, on the part of academically based physicians in particular, to 
adopt the methods, language and mentality of the financial world in evaluating the 
desirability of medical practices, specifically the use of cost-effectiveness analysis 
(CEA). Perhaps the technique is attractive to these writers because they believe in its 
power to resolve difficult issues, and they may enjoy the prestige associated with 
showing that they are conversant with the method. Alternatively, they may use it 
defensively, because it is forced upon them by powerful financial professionals who 
manage insurance firms and health care delivery systems. Other motivations may 
encourage the behavior, but in every case it should be noted that uncritical acceptance 
and dissemination of the CEA tool enhances its image and power, when an actually 
pressing need is to question its meaningfulness. Finally, from the perspective of 
Institutional economics, a quite serious danger confronts the larger community that is 
losing its control over democratic processes that determine the level and structure of 
resource use and the composition of output of the health care industry, especially that 
part of the industry supported by public funds. This danger is that decisions are 
increasingly made without significant participation of the public, in contravention of 
the ideals set forth most cogently by John Dewey. 
Dewey’s Instrumentalism 
Dewey [1927]argued forcefully that a democratic society could not use undemocratic 
means to find solutions to its problems. Indeed, only through democratic processes 
that rely on the method of scientific inquiry could a modern society achieve 
judgments that are adequate for identifying and solving social problems. He offered 
prescriptions both for identifying democratic truth and for using that insight to 
improve the lives of the members of the society. 
Inasmuch as humans exist as humans only in societies, their well-being is never 
individual; it is always social. The constant interplay between the growth of individual 
persons and the improvement of the society within which they live requires personal 
participation in political life. In that life, the person who contributes through open and 
honest communication with the community the understandings and insights that are 
peculiarly his or hers advances both personal and social well-being. Precluding such 
participation deprives both individual and community of the requisites of 
improvement. Of course, this conclusion entails the additional recognition that experts 
do not have either adequate understanding or moral authority to impose their 
interpretations on others, whether overtly through coercive assertion of their presumed 
superiority or covertly by cloaking their arguments in a disciplinary language 
unintelligible to the untrained. 
Public policy options should be offered in the manner of scientific hypotheses. These 
are to be tested with respect to their fruitfulness, and modified as necessary to achieve 
desired outcomes. As in science, small gains in understanding the nature of problems 
and the consequences of policy choice add cumulatively as participants in public 
dialogue verify the acceptability of analysis and policy proposals through disciplined 
observation and open discussion. "Warranted knowledge" is the guide and the process 
corrects its own errors. Any argument not based upon or proceeding to develop 
warranted knowledge is suspect; most obviously, deceit in the form of fabricated data 
or defective reasoning are condemned as destroyers of democratic progress. No 
amount of skillful rhetorical flourish is to be accepted as justification for granting an 
advantage to one party or another in the effort to discover compromises that are 
socially beneficial. 
A Current Problem: Allocating Resources for Health Care 
Because identification of desirable health care reforms is so difficult, many people are 
attracted to financial criteria or what they believe to be economic principles for 
making choices. A major issue concerns the "standard" of care that will be available, 
whether care is paid for with involvement of insurance companies, medical 
management consultants, health maintenance organizations, or from the public purse. 
For example, some women with breast cancer can receive autologous bone marrow 
transplantation with their insurers' blessing, but other insurers regard the treatment as 
"experimental" and deny payment for their clients. Similarly, surgery and external-
beam radiation for prostate cancer are considered standard practice by third-party 
payers, even though there is no decisive evidence that either treatment extends life. 
Other treatments for this cancer are viewed negatively by many managed-care 
administrators, who deny payment for the interventions. The latitude available to 
payers in these kinds of decisions is probably inevitable because medical literature is 
often inconclusive about the efficacy of treatments. 
Two troublesome outcomes are immediately apparent. (1) Patients are presented a 
menu of interventions for which payment is permitted. Some of the treatments may be 
effective, or all may be ineffective, but even the well-informed patient must make a 
choice from the menu. This is not a new circumstance. (2) As managed care firms, 
especially those with a profit goal, become dominant in the allocation of health care 
resources, uncertainty about the efficacy of treatments provides an opportunity to 
employ ill-suited and ill-understood canons of economic efficiency, i.e., Cost-Benefit 
Analysis and its mutant progeny, Cost-Effectiveness Analysis and Cost-Utility 
Analysis. Whether medical evidence is ambiguous or quite firm, the financial 
managers who will control medical practice will almost certainly justify their 
decisions with appeal to financial variables. This is a new tyranny that must be 
resisted, along with that of bogus demonstrations of economic efficiency. 
The presumed prestige of neoclassical economic analysis is often sought to support or 
oppose financial arrangements. Concepts of efficiency, often quite incoherent and 
incorrect (from the conventional-theory perspective) are bandied about, and esoteric 
exercises are conducted to explore efficiency implications of various policy options. 
Many such studies are published by academic physicians who display little 
acquaintance with the fine points (nay, even the rough points) of conventional 
economic theory. Their economic studies seldom advance public understanding of 
health care issues. More often, their work detracts from warranted knowledge that 
might assist the public in its deliberations. Altogether, but especially with respect to 
taxation and expenditure of public funds, this is a most undesirable situation. The 
public cannot conduct its business democratically and effectively without honest 
debate about the general nature and specific details of problems. 
This problem has been investigated in at least two other articles. The untenable 
technique of Cost-Utility Analysis and several examples of misuse of cost data for the 
related approach of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis have been criticized [Hildred and 
Beauvais 1995, Hildred and Watkins 1996]. The latter article pointed out the general 
error of using "charge" data from a single hospital as a measure of opportunity cost 
for CEA. This paper extends that analysis by demonstrating the more serious errors 
that occur when highly aggregated data from many hospitals are incorporated into 
CEA, and manipulated to produce impossibly precise results. It is important that those 
who use CEA and those who would use its results understand its limitations. If faulty 
data are used and the degree of precision of the several steps of the process is not 
carefully controlled, confidence in the results derived with the tool may be unjustified. 
Improper Data Sets 
Dozens of articles published in medical journals each year purport to show that one or 
another medical intervention is or is not "cost-effective." The very meaning of the 
term is notoriously fluid [see the discussion in Hildred and Watkins 1996], making it 
imprudent to accept at face value the findings presented in the reports. More seriously, 
many of these reports are probably useless because of their use of faulty data and 
failure to respect the problem of significant digits. 
A recent publication [Lieu et al. 1994] is reviewed next to demonstrate the nature of 
these problems and to provide a basis for evaluating the strength of the conclusions in 
such studies. The study selected for this analysis is neither the best nor the worst of 
the genre; it is simply representative. 
The Lieu study compared the efficacy of a varicella (chicken pox) vaccination 
program for children with the likely outcomes if the program were not carried out. 
The concluding argument of the article involved a comparison of several cost-
effectiveness calculations and cost-benefit ratios of the hypothetical varicella 
vaccination program with other preventive-medicine programs, and concluded that the 
varicella vaccination program was superior to the others because its cost-per-life-year-
saved was lower than that of the other programs. Proponents of the vaccination 
program would probably find this comparison advantageous, but people making a 
dispassionate decision about using public resources for medical care might not be 
persuaded. Indeed, further examination of the derivation of the study's cost-
effectiveness findings, beginning with the financial data underlying the conclusion, 
suggests the wisdom of skepticism. 
Not in dispute are the epidemiological data, such as rates of infection, complications, 
death, disability, or vaccine efficacy. Lieu et al. cite what are probably well-accepted 
data bases and published studies as the foundation for their projections. However, the 
cost data that they incorporate in their CEA do not carry the same authority. 
Use of "Charges" to Represent "Costs" 
The general problem: accounting cost vs. opportunity cost. Hildred and Watkins 
[1996] demonstrated that most medical CEAs are highly suspect because of their 
reliance on charges to represent costs of medical interventions. Neoclassical 
economic theory identifies the socially optimum price of a commodity as one that 
equals the "opportunity cost" of the resources used in its production. Opportunity cost 
is the amount that must be paid by the producer to attract and hold these resources 
away from competitive uses in their highest-valued alternative employment. This is 
also shown to equal the "marginal cost" of the firm’s use of the resource, defined as 
the addition to total cost associated with production of the last unit of the good. 
Hildred and Watkins [1996] showed that derived accounting costs are greater than 
marginal cost, and in the typical hospital environment, charges usually exceed 
accounting costs (therefore necessarily exceeding marginal cost as well). Therefore, 
charge data are not appropriate for CEA unless modified through the technique of 
"shadow pricing" (not "adjusting" by a "cost to charge ratio") to reflect marginal cost 
and opportunity cost. 
The Lieu article contains many errors of this kind; we illustrate the ramifications of 
the problem by directing attention to the authors’ specification of $7,482 as the cost of 
treating 5- to 9-year old patients hospitalized for varicella complications. First, since 
the $7,482 datum is charge-based, it is not acceptable as a measure of the "cost" of 
hospitalization for complications from varicella. 
Specific defect: use of a mean. More seriously, $7,482 is a mean of treatment 
charges and as such is a measure of charges for confinements that differ in unknown 
ways. The total amount charged for treating the 5-9 age cohort undoubtedly includes a 
distribution of expensive, less-expensive, moderately-expensive, and inexpensive 
cases, and the mean is influenced by the relative number of cases in each portion of 
the distribution, especially at the extremes. A measure of variance would indicate the 
importance of this factor, and readers have no context for interpreting the significance 
of the mean without information about dispersion. 
Additionally, in the hospital environment, charges are administered prices, not an 
outcome of the impersonal competitive market forces of neoclassical theory but 
determined by the relative bargaining power of health care providers and those who 
pay for medical care, whether as patients (with little bargaining power) or as insurers 
(with varying degrees of bargaining power). Consequently, otherwise identical 
treatment provided to different patients generates different prices, both at a moment in 
time and at different times. 
This mean, therefore, is not a basis for measuring "the" cost of hospitalizing children 
for pneumonia and encephalitis resulting from chickenpox. 
Specific defect: aggregated data base. $7,482 is the mean of treatment calculated 
from a statewide data base developed from many hospitals [377, 378]. The problem 
inherent in using a mean, as noted above, is compounded in an indeterminate manner 
by the use of aggregated data. As the mean from any single hospital masks the variety 
of charges and conveys no reliable information about opportunity cost, so the mean of 
data from multiple hospitals further buries any possibility of identifying opportunity 
cost. There is no reason to believe that all the variations among treatment intensities, 
charges, and myriad hospitals are eliminated by the mathematical process of 
calculating a mean, mystically leaving only the pure indicator of opportunity cost. 
Specific defect: aggregate adjustment factor. Finally, the $7,482 datum was 
obtained by multiplying "charges" by .53 [377], the mean ratio of cost-to-charge for 
all confinements in all hospitals in California for some unspecified year. This number 
is unacceptable as a multiplier, first because the required adjustment must be one that 
gets at marginal cost, not a derived accounting cost, and the administered pricing 
problem is ineluctable. Secondly, a statewide ratio (presumably the calculated mean 
of all hospitals' cost/charge ratios for all services provided by those hospitals) 
conceals more than it reveals. 
For example, within each hospital, a stated cost/charge ratio for coronary bypass 
surgery, would be the mean of charges collected from patients without insurance, 
patients with private insurance (whose company has negotiated a reimbursement 
schedule for the service), and patients covered by Medicare or Medicaid (each with a 
negotiated reimbursement schedule, possibly quite different from each other and 
certainly different from the rate laid upon the uninsured person). As a consequence, 
the calculated cost/charge ratio for bypass operations for any time period will depend 
on the mix of patients and their payment sources. Moreover, the cost/charge ratio for 
each hospital's provision of, e.g., maternity care, will be subject to the same variation, 
as will the cost/charge ratio for every service provided by the hospital. That variation 
should be expected to differ with each contract with third-party payers. Some services 
may be reimbursed more or less generously with each contract, as bargaining power 
shifts one way or another. The upshot of the situation is that the mean cost/charge 
ratio for any single hospital is misleading; for all hospitals in a state, the mean of the 
ratios for each discrete service is meaningless, and the mean of the ratios of all 
hospitals for all services is totally vacuous. 
Questionable Representativeness of Data 
Other sources of data are problematic. The research team reported prices of 
emergency room visits for varicella complications at $163, outpatient visits at $42, 
and $3 for telephone advice, all the result of "consultations" with staff of the Kaiser 
health care group. Since HMOs are touted as "different" from other kinds of 
providers, chiefly with respect to their cost structures (and, accordingly, their 
accounting systems), there is no compelling reason to accept these data as 
representative of all health care providers. 
It is truly astounding that the cost of the vaccine was not known by the investigators. 
"Informal discussion" is not an acceptable scientific foundation for a decision to 
specify a price of $35 for each dose. What range of prices is found? What accounts for 
the differences in price? What proportion of buyers obtains the vaccine at the various 
prices? All of these questions bear heavily on the believability of the $35 price. It is 
especially significant that the dosage price was the only dollar-value parameter 
selected for sensitivity analysis: along with vaccine administration strategies, it was 
"varied over plausible ranges" [Lieu et al. 1994, 378]. A reader of the article could not 
determine from the information provided whether the sensitivity test variations were 
able to produce anything other than "noise" -- as Kamarck warns about (see below). 
This "datum" is so important that inability to identify it precisely is a fatal weakness. 
Finally, the choice of $10,000 as the annual cost of long term care for people disabled 
by the disease appears to be without any foundation. The authors noted that there are 
no data on this phenomenon, and simply chose $10,000 for the calculation. 
Turning now to the problem of estimating error, we believe that attention to 
significant digits would help achieve recognition of the range of error that may be 
encountered in carrying out this component of a CEA. We follow the lead of Andrew 
Kamarck, whose work rests firmly on the nature of measurement; its fundamental 
postulates are quite sound, regardless of other extensions of measurement theory that 
may be found in methodological literature. 
The Significant Digits Problem 
Kamarck has recommended that economists take a page from their colleagues in the 
physical sciences and adopt the practice of specifying the margin of error of their 
results by reference to significant digits. Noting the inordinate commitment to refining 
data sets in complete disregard of their accuracy [Kamarck, 119-120], he advised 
researchers to remember the difference of meaning when a number is used in a 
theoretical manner, as distinct from real-world measurement [135]. 
To illustrate with an example, the number 220 has three significant digits, with the 
number of hundreds and tens known to be two, but the number of units has resulted 
from rounding of a real world measurement. If the units were known exactly, the 
number would be written as 220.0 and have four significant digits. 
The rules of significant digits include as significant all the digits to the right of the 
decimal point and non-zero digits to the left of the decimal point. Continuing the 
example, the number 200 indicates a true value between 150 and 250, while 220 
denotes a true value between 215 and 225; 222 means that the true value is between 
221.5 and 222.5. 
Important as it may be to identify the precision of a measurement in this way, it is 
more crucial to be aware that the results of familiar mathematical procedures depend 
for their aggregate precision on the precision with which every component of the 
process is measured. Kamarck reminds us that when mathematical manipulations are 
carried out on a set of numbers, the resulting answer is ". . . accurate to a number of 
significant digits no greater and usually less than the number of significant digits 
in any one of the original numbers" [136, emphasis in original]. Continuing our 
example, if the number 220 (known to be significant to two digits) is divided by 0.5 
(significant to a single digit), the resulting quotient of 440 is significant to the least 
significant digit used in the division. In this case, the one significant digit found in 0.5 
makes the quotient of 440 significant to the hundreds digit only. All that can be said is 
that the true number is somewhere between 350 and 450. Thus, in a calculation 
involving many different numbers with both large and small numbers of significant 
digits, the more likely it ". . . is useless and misleading to manipulate to a large 
number of places when one item is known only very roughly" [136]. 
As to the possibility of rescue through the application of sensitivity analysis, Kamarck 
is equally cautionary. 
  Very often the results of the usual type of sensitivity analysis are completely 
meaningless because they are swamped by the 'noise' in the numbers 
concerned. For example, the parameter being examined is taken as, say, '3167' 
when there is in reality one significant digit: the true number should have been 
written as 3000. A sensitivity analysis that tests a 10 per cent variation is in fact 
a useless exercise since the margin of error, +500, in the number is greater than 
the +317 of the variation tested [140]. 
The first table of the varicella article [377] presents nonfinancial probability data, 
extending many places to the right of the decimal (in the case of the probability of 
death as a complication, the probability presented is 0.0000082). In addition to death, 
probabilities are listed for the population rate of infection (for 5-9 year-olds, serving 
as an example: each age group has a different probability), rates per case of major 
complications requiring hospitalization (and of these, specific rates for pneumonia and 
encephalitis), and a rate of long-term disability from encephalitis. The table also lists 
outcome probabilities of several medical interventions, vaccine efficacy variation, and 
work loss. These data are followed by another table with estimates of costs for the 
medical interventions, medication and vaccine, long-term care for victims disabled by 
the disease, work-loss by parents, adult sufferers, and the disabled and dead victims. 
The key table [378] presents summative data on the findings of the simulation 
concerning reduction of: number of cases, major complications (including pneumonia 
and encephalitis), disability and death, and costs due to treatment and work loss. 
These data underlie the calculation of the "cost-effectiveness" of the proposed 
vaccination program. Five effectiveness outcomes are presented, with and without 
discounting 30 years into the future. Thus, we learn that it would cost $4.20 to prevent 
a case of chickenpox, $1,650 to prevent a major complication, $832,000 to prevent 
each instance of long-term disability, $294,000 to prevent a death, and $16,000 to 
achieve each "life-year saved"[379]. 
The team of authors conceded that life-saving results are seldom an issue in this 
disease, but because the ostensibly neutral common denominator for comparisons 
among medical interventions is cost per life-year saved, concluded their argument 
with such a comparison. Thus, the varicella program is rated against others[380]: 
  Varicella vaccination, children $16,000 
Hypertension screening, mid-age men 21,300 
Hepatitis B vaccination, infants 41,000 
Colorectal cancer screening, elderly 45,000 
Cholesterol reduction 132,000 
On this reading, the varicella prevention program should be preferred to the others. 
However, the data problems set forth above should give pause about the cogency of 
the comparison, and turning to the significant digits issue, we recall Kamarck's 
stricture regarding the element of the chain with the fewest significant digits. In this 
study, it seems that the culprit has at best two significant digits, constituting the 
weakest link in the analysis. Beginning with the probabilities relating to effects of the 
disease, and putting all in the same scientific notation, we observe that there would be 
[378]: 
  Without Program With Program 
New cases 3.953 (106) .24 (106) 
Major sequellae .009930 (106) .0000610 (106) 
Disability .000020 (106) .0000001 (106) 
Death .000056 (106). .0000004 (106) 
In this array, the number of new cases with the program (240,000) is presented with 
two significant digits; it is the foundation from which the frequency of the other 
events associated with the vaccination program is calculated. However, following 
Kamarck, none of the succeeding estimates can contribute meaningfully to the 
calculation of effects, despite their derivation from probabilities with as many as 
seven significant digits 
The cost data are similarly constrained: in their third table [378], the authors state the 
program cost at $88 (106) and the reduction of costs of the disease as $10 (106). 
Though these may be the result of summing various numbers with more significant 
digits, there are only two significant digits here. Thus, on both the cost side and the 
effectiveness side of the consideration, two significant digits limit the calculations, 
and most of the profuse number-manipulation yield mostly "noise." 
Finally, the authors’ decision to state their case for their program in terms of the cost-
per-life-year-saved criterion seems completely self-defeating, given their explicit 
admission of the unimportance of saving lives by intervening in this disease. There are 
probably some persuasive considerations to support a varicella immunization 
program, but they are obscured by CEA, and especially by mention of cost-per-life-
year-saved. 
Conclusion 
As a prudent reader must entertain serious doubt about the relative economic 
attractiveness of the varicella vaccination program, so should he or she recognize the 
danger in uncritical acceptance of the CEA-determined value of any medical 
intervention. It is untenable to concatenate treatment outcome measures, some 
elements of which may be accurate to many significant digits and others much less 
accurate, in highly aggregated summary indicators of "effectiveness" of an 
intervention. Some credence might be granted to a competently performed analysis of 
the costs of treatments, taken as a separate inquiry, but joining the unavoidable and 
probably large inaccuracies of cost data with considerably more accurate 
"effectiveness" measures only generates "noise," not scientific insight. 
Users of faulty data and practitioners of faulty analysis may be expected to react 
negatively to criticism of their work, insisting that the critic set forth a better way, 
directed to the development of procedures to improve the measures and analysis. 
However, it is not better measurements that are required for the elevation of public 
discussion of health care resources. Indeed, the drive to quantify might well distract 
from the substance of a public dialogue that could engender understanding and 
selection of desired policies, especially if the results of the experts’ "measurements" 
are deceptive. Nor is improvement in computerized manipulation of those data a 
solution to the problem discussed here. Even in the unlikely event that the opportunity 
cost data were routinely recorded, and ever more complex algorithms developed, the 
results of such projects must be debated intelligently by those affected by the choices 
to be made, i.e., the citizens of a democratic society, an activity not encouraged by 
obscurantist analyses undertaken to confer advantage on a particular course of action. 
The "better way" is the method of social inquiry proposed by Dewey [1927]. There is 
no neoclassical "natural law" solution awaiting discovery; there are political solutions 
awaiting creation. These arise from inquiry into the sources and causes of social 
problems, being based on warranted knowledge, that is, conclusions reached through 
dialogue about verifiable evidence. Those who wish the community to acknowledge 
great merit in a medical procedure should do so in an atmosphere in which they must 
prove that merit, not least by establishing the soundness of the data and calculations 
offered in its defense. The community must develop a more honest and responsible 
discussion, in which advocacy of a position cannot take the form of the following, a 
comment [Anonymous, 1996] made by one who had just read the foregoing article: 
I take my hat off to Lieu et al. They are pushing a good thing. . . . If they can get this 
vaccine in use, it will save lives. If they can cook up some calculation that improves 
the chances of approval, more power to them. 
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